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Abstract 
The August war in 2008 between Russia and Georgia caught the world by surprise 
but nevertheless brought the European Union (EU) to the forefront of the international 
efforts to end the hostilities, and the EU became the leading international actor 
involved with the conflict resolution process. However, in the years following the 
armed conflict, the conflict resolution process lost pace, and the impact of the EU 
beyond the immediate aftermath of the August 2008 war has been put into 
question. By undertaking a qualitative case study, this paper aims to explore to what 
extent the EU has impacted on the conflict resolution process of Georgia’s 
secessionist conflicts in 2008-2015. It will argue that the EU’s policies have only to a 
limited extent impacted on this conflict resolution process, which can be related to 
the objectives, priorities and time perspectives of the EU’s conflict resolution policies. 
The EU’s efforts have significantly contributed to the objective of conflict prevention, 
but the profile of the EU in the field of international conflict management weakened 
its position in the area of conflict transformation, where the lack of progress in turn 
limited the EU’s impact in the areas of international conflict management and 
conflict settlement. The main conclusion put forward is that in order to have a true 
impact, the EU needs to undertake a differentiated, balanced and patient 
approach to conflict resolution. 
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Introduction 
On 8 August 2008, the world was taken by surprise when Russian troops for the first 
time since 1979 crossed national borders to attack sovereign state,1 which resulted in 
the greatest crisis for European security in over a decade. 2  The five-day war 
between Russia and Georgia caused the death of hundreds of soldiers and civilians, 
thousands wounded, the displacement of over 100 000 of people,3 and the de facto 
loss of the Georgian breakaway regions Abkhazia and South Ossetia.4 The European 
Union (EU) and the rest of the international community by large failed to prevent the 
outbreak of hostilities in August 2008,5 but the war nevertheless brought the EU to the 
forefront of the international efforts to end the armed Georgian-Russian conflict. The 
EU played an instrumental role in ending the hostilities by mediating the six-point 
ceasefire agreement and by launching the European Union Monitoring Mission 
(EUMM) Georgia. 6  The secessionist conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia was 
brought to the top of the EU’s agenda, and the EU became the leading international 
actor involved with the conflict resolution process in Georgia.7 A new EU Special 
Representative (EUSR) for the crisis in Georgia was appointed to mediate between 
the conflict parties in the Geneva International Discussions (GID), and the European 
Commission became one of the largest donors of humanitarian assistance and 
funding for peacebuilding projects in Abkhazia.8  
 
The role of the EU in the aftermath of the August 2008 war has been celebrated as a 
major diplomatic success9 and has attracted significant attention by both policy 
makers and academic scholars in the fields of international and European security, 
conflict resolution and secessionist conflicts. However, in the years following the 
outbreak of hostilities when the security situation was relatively stabilised, the conflict 
1 S.E. Cornell & F. Starr, “Introduction”, in S.E. Cornell & F. Starr (eds.), The Guns of August 2008 
– Russia’s War in Georgia, Armonk, M.E. Sharpe, 2009, p. 3. 
2 R.D. Asmus, A Little War That Shook the World, Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p. 4. 
3 Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (IIFFMCG), Report 
Volume I, September 2009, p. 5. 
4 J. Boonstra & L. Delcour, “A broken region: evaluating EU policies in the South Caucasus”, 
FRIDE Policy Briefs, no. 193, January 2015, p. 2. 
5 Asmus, op. cit., p. 7. 
6 N. Popescu, EU Foreign Policy and Post-Soviet Conflicts, London, Routledge, 2011, p. 86-92. 
7 M. Merlingen & R. Ostrauskaite, “EU Peacebuilding in Georgia: Limits and Achievements”, in 
S. Blockmans, J. Wouters & T. Ruys (eds.), The European Union and Peacebuidling, The Hague, 
T.M.C. Asser Press, 2010, p. 270. 
8 European Union Delegation to Georgia, EU Assistance to People Affected by Conflict in 
Georgia – Overview, Tbilisi, October 2011, pp. 4-5. 
9 Merlingen & Ostrauskaite, op. cit., p. 288.  4 
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resolution process lost pace,10 and the interest for the secessionist conflicts among 
academics and policy makers has gradually decreased since then. The EU’s impact 
on the conflict resolution process in Georgia in the longer term has been put into 
question,11 but more recent literature on the topic seems to be missing by large. 
Further on, existing research appears to be mainly empirical and falls short of 
providing a theoretical framework in which the EU’s involvement with conflict 
resolution in Georgia can be sufficiently understood.12 Yet, the Ukraine crisis and the 
Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 have shed new light on the status of the 
protracted and secessionist conflicts in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood. The 
strategic partnership and alliance treaties signed between Russia and Abkhazia in 
2014 13  and between Russia and South Ossetia in 2015 14  further on call for new 
attentiveness to the EU’s involvement and impact on the conflict resolution process 
of Georgia’s secessionist conflicts. 
 
This paper aims to explore to what extent the EU has impacted on the conflict 
resolution process of Georgia’s secessionist conflicts in 2008-2015, and whether this 
can be related to the objectives, priorities and time perspectives of the EU’s conflict 
resolution policies. A qualitative case study of the EU’s conflict resolution policies will 
be conducted building on Bruno Coppieters’ differentiated approach to conflict 
resolution.15 The ambition is to make an empirical contribution filling into the current 
research gap, as well as to provide a potential theoretical framework in which the 
EU’s involvement with conflict resolution in Georgia could be understood. The 
application of Coppieters’ differentiated approach may also serve to test its validity 
as an analytical framework to assess the impact of the EU’s conflict resolution 
policies beyond the August 2008 war. Hopefully, the findings of this paper will also 
prove valuable to inform the EU’s future conflict resolution policies in Georgia, and 
potentially as well in other conflict resolution contexts where the EU is active or about 
to be engaged. 
10 R.G. Whitman & S. Wolff, “The EU as a conflict manager? The Case of Georgia and its 
implications”, International Affairs, vol. 86, no. 1, 2010, p. 93. 
11 Ibid., pp. 89-94. 
12  N. Popescu, “EU and the Eastern Neighbourhood: Reluctant Involvement in Conflict 
Resolution”, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 14, no. 4, November 2009, p. 459. 
13  “Moscow, Sokhumi Sign Treaty on Alliance and Strategic Partnership”, Civil.ge, 24 
November 2014. 
14 “Pact Brings South Ossetia Closer to Russia”, The Wall Street Journal, 18 March 2015. 
15 B. Coppieters, “The EU and Georgia: time perspectives in conflict resolution”, European 
Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) Occasional Paper, no. 70, December 2007, pp. 1-29.  5 
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The paper will show that the EU has only to a limited extent impacted on the conflict 
resolution process of Georgia’s secessionist conflicts from 2008 until today, which can 
be related to the objectives, priorities and time perspectives of the EU’s conflict 
resolution policies. The EU’s efforts have to a great degree contributed to the 
achievement of the objective of conflict prevention. However, the profile of the EU in 
the field of international conflict management weakened its position in the area of 
conflict transformation, where the lack of progress in turn limited the EU’s impact in 
the areas of international conflict management and conflict settlement. These results 
demonstrate the interrelatedness of different objectives of conflict resolution as well 
as the need for the EU to undertake a differentiated, balanced and patient 
approach to conflict resolution in order to be able to achieve positive results in the 
shorter and longer term.  
 
The paper will commence with a presentation of the theoretical framework and 
methodology applied in this work, followed by a shorter overview of the secessionist 
conflicts and the EU’s conflict resolution policies between 2008 and 2015. A 
qualitative case study and analysis of the EU’s involvement with Georgia’s 
secessionist conflicts will then follow and the paper will end with a conclusion and 
discussion of the main findings. 
 
A differentiated approach to conflict resolution  
When examining the EU’s engagement with conflict resolution in Georgia from the 
beginning of the 1990s until 2007, Bruno Coppieters proposes an analysis of the 
broader framework of conflict resolution policies through a differentiation of four 
distinctive objectives: conflict prevention, conflict transformation, international 
conflict management and conflict settlement, each with specific tasks to achieve.16 
The realisation of these policy objectives corresponds to a particular timeframe, but 
this does not imply that they should be achieved in sequence but rather that they 
are best pursued in parallel and closely linked to each other, according to their 
respective time perspectives. Steps taken within one of the policy objectives will 
have an immediate effect on the others where the emphasis of one objective may 
happen at the expense of others, hence worsening the overall prospects for conflict 
resolution. Any kind of linkage that overlooks the diversity of policy types and 
16 Ibid.  6 
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distinctive time spans required for each of them to yield positive results may 
negatively impact on the broader process of conflict resolution. Coppieters therefore 
argues that a differentiated, balanced and patient approach to the various policy 
objectives in conflict resolution should in principle allow for positive results to be 
achieved in both the shorter and the longer term.17 Consequently, the objectives, 
priorities and time perspectives of the EU’s conflict resolution policies in Georgia 
could serve as useful analytical distinctions to describe and assess their potential 
impact. 
Conflict prevention 
Conflict prevention is the first objective of conflict resolution, and it maintains that 
“the incompatibility of positions should not escalate to open violence”, the aim for 
the parties being the resolution of the conflict by peaceful means.18 This objective is 
closely linked to developments in the other fields of conflict resolution, where a lack 
of progress might cause frustration that could lead to confrontation and the 
escalation of open violence. Conflict prevention is also a prominent subject in 
discussions on conflict settlement, where a political mechanism in the security 
domain is needed in order to “de-escalate post-settlement conflicts”.19 There are 
consequently two timeframes for conflict prevention policies: one aiming to prevent 
any escalation of open violence in the present, and another creating a functional 
framework capable of providing security in the longer term.20 
Conflict transformation 
The second objective is conflict transformation where “the parties’ positions have to 
be made more compatible”.21 Policies of conflict transformation aim at changing 
the degree of incompatibility between the parties’ positions, where the identities 
and interests of the various parties and communities are brought closer together. 
Informal diplomacy is also undertaken with the aim to create equal opportunities for 
members of the different conflict communities to discuss new prospects for conflict 
resolution. Conflict transformation policies require continuous and finely balanced 
efforts with a long-time perspective to achieve positive results, and they should be 
supported regardless of setbacks in other areas of conflict resolution. Due to the 
17 Ibid., pp. 4-28. 
18 Ibid., pp. 3, 14. 
19 Ibid., pp. 6, 14. 
20 Ibid., p. 18. 
21 Ibid., p. 3.  7 
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timeframe required, policies of conflict transformation cannot be suspended or 
made contingent on progress or failures in other fields, but should nevertheless not 
be detached from the work done within other areas of conflict resolution.22 
International conflict management 
International conflict management is the third objective with the aim to “contain the 
escalation of conflicts and create incentives for a settlement, by exercising leverage 
on the parties or by changing the balance of power between them”.23 Policies of 
international conflict management typically aim to de-escalate tensions between 
the parties by offering mediation for the handling of disputes. An international actor 
may also need to support the position of one of the parties in order to create 
incentives for an agreement. However, in order for such a policy to contribute to the 
overall process of conflict resolution, it also needs to be in accordance with a policy 
of conflict transformation and not cause the parties to drift further apart from each 
other. In other words, an increased EU profile in conflict management could weaken 
its position in conflict transformation and it is therefore of importance to avoid a clash 
or imbalance between these two policy objectives.24 
Conflict settlement 
The fourth and final objective is conflict settlement where “the parties should reach 
agreement on a common institutional framework”.25 In this context, joint decision-
making will demonstrate that the identities and interests of the parties have been 
made compatible. The aim of conflict settlement policies in the context of Georgia’s 
secessionist conflicts is to facilitate and support negotiations on the international 
status of the two breakaway regions. One of the main obstacles to overcome in 
negotiations is the incompatibility of positions of the conflict parties, whose 
rapprochement is the objective of conflict transformation, once again highlighting 
the importance of closely linking the different policy objectives. Conflict settlement 
policies are also important in the context of conflict prevention, as a lack of progress 
on the question of status could generate violent confrontation and escalation. 
However, efforts within the other objectives should not be made contingent on the 
progress or failure of conflict settlement and patience is needed if progress in the 
22 Ibid., pp. 5-6, 18, 27. 
23 Ibid., p. 4. 
24 Ibid., pp. 6, 21-22. 
25 Ibid., p. 4.  8 
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other fields is to generate more favourable conditions to successfully reach a conflict 
settlement.26 
 
A qualitative case study 
In assessing the potential impact of the EU on the conflict resolution processes in 
Georgia in 2008-2015, a case study of four different EU conflict resolution policies will 
be undertaken: the EUMM, the EUSR for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia, 
the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), and the Instrument 
for Stability (IfS). For the purpose of this paper, the concept of “impact” is understood 
to mean the contribution to the progress of the conflict resolution processes in 
Georgia within the fixed time frame. A “conflict resolution process” is further on 
perceived as the parallel policies and activities being undertaken within the four 
distinctive policy objectives of conflict prevention, conflict transformation, 
international conflict management and conflict settlement. In the context of this 
research, the two secessionist conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia will moreover 
be approached as one single conflict resolution process.  
 
In order to assess the impact of the EU on the conflict resolution process of Georgia’s 
secessionist conflicts, a tool of analysis building on Coppieters’ differentiated 
approach to conflict resolution will be applied. This tool will be used to examine to 
what degree the EU’s conflict resolution policies have been able to contribute to the 
achievement of each of the four policy objectives of conflict prevention, conflict 
transformation, international conflict management and conflict settlement. To this 
end, the cumulative contributions of the EUMM, the EUSR for the South Caucasus 
and the crisis in Georgia, the ENPI and the IfS, will be assigned a value for each of 
the policy objectives on a scale including “to a great degree”, “to some degree”, 
and “to a poor degree”.  
Conflict prevention 
The objective of conflict prevention is defined as “the incompatibility of positions 
should not escalate to open violence”. 27  In the context of this paper, conflict 
prevention policies are consequently understood as those aiming to prevent the 
incompatibility of positions between the parties from escalating to open violence, 
26 Ibid., pp. 4-6, 23-25, 29. 
27 Ibid., p. 3.  9 
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both in present time and in the longer term. “Open violence” is further on 
understood as a security situation resembling that of the August war in 2008. To attain 
the value “to a great degree”, the accumulated contributions of the EU’s conflict 
resolution policies need to have prevented the escalation of open violence, and to 
have contributed to discussions on the establishment of a post-settlement security 
mechanism. For the value “to some degree”, the accumulated contributions need 
have partly prevented the escalation of open violence, and to some extent have 
contributed to discussions on the establishment of a security mechanism in the 
longer term. Finally, to attain the value “to a poor degree”, the accumulated 
contributions should have failed to prevent the escalation of open violence, and to 
not have contributed to the establishment of any kind of security mechanism in the 
longer term.  
Conflict transformation 
For the objective of conflict transformation to be achieved, “the parties’ positions 
have to be made more compatible”.28 In this paper, conflict transformation policies 
will be understood as those aiming at changing the degree of incompatibility 
between the parties’ positions whereby the identities and interests of the conflicting 
parties are brought closer together. To attain the value “to a great degree”, the 
accumulated contributions of the EU’s conflict resolution policies need to have 
changed the degree of incompatibility between the parties’ positions, whereby the 
identities and interests of the conflicting parties have been brought closer together. 
For the value “to some degree”, the accumulated contributions need to have partly 
changed the degree of incompatibility between the parties’ positions, whereby the 
identities and interests of the conflicting parties to some extent have been brought 
closer together. Lastly, to attain the value “to a poor degree”, the accumulated 
contributions should have failed to change the degree of incompatibility between 
the parties’ positions whereby the identities and interests of the conflicting parties 
have not been brought closer together. 
International conflict management 
For the objective of international conflict management to be realised, external 
actors need to “contain the escalation of conflicts and create incentives for a 
settlement, by exercising leverage on the parties or by changing the balance of 
28 Ibid.  10 
                                                        
EU Diplomacy Paper 6/2015 
power between them”.29 In the context of this paper, policies of international conflict 
management will be understood as those aiming to de-escalate tensions between 
the parties by mediation efforts, the support of one of the parties’ positions, the 
exercise of leverage on all or some of the parties or the change of balance of power 
between them in order to create incentives for a settlement. To attain the value “to 
a great degree”, the accumulated contributions of the EU’s conflict resolution 
policies need to have contained the escalation of conflicts between the parties 
through mediation efforts and to have created incentives for a settlement.  For the 
value “to some degree”, the accumulated contributions need to have partly 
contained the escalation of conflicts between the parties through mediation efforts 
and to some extent have created incentives for a settlement. Finally, to attain the 
value “to a poor degree”, the accumulated contributions should have failed to 
contain the escalation of conflicts between the parties as well as to not have 
created incentives for a settlement. 
Conflict settlement 
For the objective of conflict settlement to be achieved, “the parties should reach 
agreement on a common institutional framework”.30 This paper understands conflict 
settlement policies as those aiming to facilitate and support negotiations on the 
international status of the two breakaway regions, ultimately leading to an 
agreement on a common institutional framework. To attain the value “to a great 
degree”, the accumulated contributions of the EU’s conflict resolution policies need 
to have facilitated and supported negotiations on the international status of the 
breakaway regions, where an agreement on a common institutional framework 
should have been reached by the parties. For the value “to some degree”, the 
accumulated contributions need to have somehow supported negotiations on the 
international status of the breakaway regions, however without having led to an 
agreement by the parties on a common institutional framework. Lastly, to attain the 
value “to a poor degree”, the accumulated contributions should have failed to 
support negotiations on the international status of the breakaway regions, where no 
agreement on a common institutional framework should have been reached by the 
parties. 
29 Ibid., pp. 3-4. 
30 Ibid., p. 4.  11 
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As the theoretical framework and methodology applied in this work have now been 
presented, the paper will below proceed with a shorter overview of the secessionist 
conflicts and the EU’s conflict resolution policies between 2008 and 2015.  
The secessionist conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
Georgia’s secessionist conflicts over Abkhazia and South Ossetia have their origins in 
Soviet history with different interpretations of what the conflicts are about as well as 
who constitutes a party.31 The diverging views of the parties involved in the conflicts, 
that is, Georgia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Russia, complicate an impartial 
historical background to the secessionist conflicts. This holds especially regarding the 
details of the start of the August 2008 war where all parties have been found to 
commit actions in violation of international law.32 The violent conflict that erupted 
between 8-12 August could be described as a combined inter-state and intra-state 
conflict, with opposing Georgian and Russian forces at one level, and South Ossetian 
and Abkhaz fighters opposing Georgian forces at the other level. 33  When the 
ceasefire agreement was signed between Moscow and Tbilisi on 12 August, the war 
had resulted in 850 casualties, thousands wounded, the displacement of more than 
100 000 people34 and severe damages to infrastructure and civilian property.35 The 
six-point Agreement committed the parties to not resort to force, to provide free 
access for humanitarian aid, and the withdrawal of troops from both sides to their 
positions prior to the outbreak of hostilities. The agreement also foresaw the opening 
of international talks on security and stability arrangements in the breakaway 
regions.36   
 
On 26 August 2008, Russia recognised the independence of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia as sovereign states, which provoked strong verbal reactions from Tbilisi37 and 
the West.38 In October 2008, the Law of Georgia on Occupied Territories entered into 
force, establishing a special legal regime over the breakaway regions, restricting 
31 Frichova Grono, op. cit., p. 9. 
32 IIFFMCG, op. cit., pp. 7, 22-26. 
33 Ibid., p. 10. 
34 Ibid., p. 5. 
35 Frichova Grono, op. cit., p. 10. 
36 Council of the European Union, Press Release – Extraordinary meeting General Affairs and 
External Relations, 12453/08 (Presse 236), Brussels, 13 August 2008, pp. 6-7. 
37 “Russia Backs Independence of Georgian Enclaves”, The New York Times, 26 August 2008. 
38 S. E. Cornell, J. Popjanevski & N. Nilsson, “Russia’s War in Georgia: Causes and Implications 
for Georgia and the World”, Policy Paper Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies 
Program, August 2008, p. 22.  12 
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migration and economic activities. 39 Moscow has since August 2008 maintained 
significant political, economic and military support to Abkhazia and South Ossetia.40 
In November 2014, Russia and Abkhazia signed a “Treaty on Alliance and Strategic 
Partnership”41 forming a joint Russian and Abkhazian force and doubling Russia’s 
subsidies to Abkhazia for 2015, provoking strong reactions from Tbilisi, Brussels and 
Washington.42 Russia also signed a “Treaty on Alliance and Integration” with South 
Ossetia in March 2015, laying out a framework for the integration of Russian and 
South Ossetian security forces, military and customs services and the joint protection 
of borders. The treaty has been condemned by the EU, the United States and 
Georgia, stating that it was in clear violation of Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial 
integrity.43 
 
The EU’s conflict resolution policies in Georgia in 2008-2015 
Prior to a rather limited engagement with Georgia’s secessionist conflicts since the 
beginning of the 1990s, the EU was at the forefront of the international efforts to stop 
the five-day war in August 2008. The then head of the EU Presidency, French 
President Nicolas Sarkozy, engaged in a series of diplomatic negotiations between 
the parties that resulted in the signature of the six-point Agreement.44 The EU as well 
played an instrumental role in the signing of the Agreement on Implementation 
Measures between Georgia and Russia on 8 September,45 where points were added 
on the withdrawal of Russian peacekeeping forces, international monitoring and 
consultation mechanisms.46 The EU’s position has since been to support Georgia’s 
territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders. In its approach to the 
breakaway regions, it deploys a strategy of engagement without recognition, where 
it seeks to engage with the entities in support of long-term conflict resolution at the 
same time as remaining adherent to Georgia’s territorial integrity.47 Below follows a 
shorter presentation of the EU’s four main conflict resolution policies in Georgia, 
39 M. Saakashvili, The President of Georgia, The Law of Georgia on Occupied Territories, Tbilisi, 
23 October 2008.  
40 Popescu, EU Foreign Policy and Post-Soviet Conflicts, op. cit., pp. 67-68. 
41 “Moscow, Sokhumi Sign Treaty on Alliance and Strategic Partnership”, op. cit. 
42  “West Rejects Treaty Between Russia, Abkhazia”, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, 25 
November 2014. 
43 “Pact Brings South Ossetia Closer to Russia”, op. cit. 
44 Popescu, EU Foreign Policy and Post-Soviet Conflicts, op. cit., p. 86. 
45 Whitman & Wolff, op. cit., p. 93. 
46 International Alert, International Engagement in the Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict Resolution 
Process, May 2010, p. 36. 
47 “EU-Georgia relations”, European External Action Service (EEAS).  13 
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namely the EUMM, the EUSR for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia, the 
ENPI and the IfS. 
The European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia 
On 1 October 2008, the EU launched an unarmed civilian monitoring mission to 
Georgia, the EUMM Georgia. The mission is set out to monitor the actions of the 
conflict parties and their full compliance with the six-point Agreement, to contribute 
to stabilisation, normalisation, confidence building and to inform EU policy for a 
political solution to the conflict. The short-term objective of the EUMM is to stabilise 
the situation and to reduce the risk of a resumption of hostilities, as well as to 
contribute to the long-term stability in Georgia and the surrounding region.48 The 
mission deploys around 200 monitors patrolling the buffer zones around the conflict 
zones, in particular the areas adjacent to the Administrative Border Lines (ABLs) of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The mandate covers the territory of Georgia’s 
internationally recognised borders, however the mission has so far been denied 
access by the de facto authorities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia to the territories 
under their control.49  
The EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia 
On 25 September 2008, Pierre Morel was appointed as the first EUSR for the crisis in 
Georgia50 with a mandate to prepare for and represent the EU’s position in the GID, 
as well as to facilitate the overall implementation of the six-point Agreement and the 
Agreement on Implementation Measures.51 The previous position and mandate of 
the EUSR for the South Caucasus, established in 2003, was kept until September 2011 
when the two mandates were merged into one, the EUSR for the South Caucasus 
and the crisis in Georgia. 52 The broad mandate now includes contributing to a 
peaceful settlement of the conflicts in the South Caucasus, including Georgia’s 
conflicts and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, as well as to encourage regional 
cooperation. Additionally, the EUSR is mandated to co-chair and represent the EU in 
48 Council of the European Union, “Council Joint Action (2008/736/CFSP) of 15 September 
2008 on the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia, EUMM Georgia”, Official Journal 
of the European Union, L248, 17 September 2008, pp. 26-27. 
49 “EUMM – European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia”, EUMM. 
50 Popescu, EU Foreign Policy and Post-Soviet Conflicts, op. cit., p. 89. 
51 Council of the European Union, “Council Joint Action (2008/760/CFSP) of 25 September 
2008 appointing the European Union Special Representative for the crisis in Georgia”, Official 
Journal of the European Union, L259, 27 September 2008, p. 16. 
52 European External Action Service, European Union Special Representative for the South 
Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia, Brussels, 2 February 2015, p. 1.  14 
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the GID and to facilitate the implementation of the ceasefire agreements.53 In the 
context of this paper, the term EUSR for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia 
will synonymously be used for both of the mandates prior to 2011, as well as the 
mandate after the merger in 2011. 
 
The GID was launched in October 200854 following the six-point Agreement, calling 
for the “opening of international talks on the security and stability arrangements in 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia”.55 The talks bring together representatives of Georgia, 
Russia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and are co-chaired by the EU through the EUSR, 
the United Nations (UN) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCE). The GID mandate extends to the whole territory of Georgia56 and the 
talks aim in particular to cover security and stability arrangements in the region, the 
situation concerning Internationally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees, as well as 
any other subject brought up by mutual agreement between the parties.57  
The European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument and the Instrument for 
Stability  
The main financial instruments through which the EU channels funding for conflict 
resolution in Georgia are the ENPI and the IfS, which provide aid in the form of 
contracts and grants to international and local organisations and non-governmental 
organisations.58 Since the 2008 war, EU-funded programmes in South Ossetia remain 
highly limited due to restrictions imposed by the de facto South Ossetian authorities, 
but in Abkhazia the EU is one of the largest international donors.59  
 
For the period of 2007-2010, €19 million of grant assistance was allocated to support 
for a peaceful settlement of the conflicts in the breakaway regions through the ENPI, 
devoted to rehabilitation and reconstruction projects, confidence building and 
53 Council of the European Union, “Council Decision (2011/518/CFSP) of 25 August 2011 
appointing the European Union Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis 
in Georgia”, Official Journal of the European Union, L221, 27 August 2011, pp. 5-6. 
54 Merlingen & Ostrauskaite, op. cit., p. 289. 
55 Council of the European Union, Press Release – Extraordinary meeting, op. cit., p. 7. 
56 Merlingen & Ostrauskaite, op. cit., pp. 289-290. 
57 Council of the European Union, “Council Joint Action (2008/760/CFSP)”, op. cit., p. 16. 
58 “Overview”, Delegation of the European Union to Georgia. 
59 European Union Delegation to Georgia, EU Assistance to People Affected by Conflict in 
Georgia, op. cit., pp. 4-5.  15 
                                                        
Emilia Jeppsson 
measures to improve the living conditions for affected populations and IDPs.60 In the 
aftermath of the 2008 war, an addition of €66 million was allocated to the ENPI.61 
Between 2011 and 2013, the corresponding grant assistance for conflict resolution 
amounted to €9-18 million.62 For the period of 2014-2020, the ENPI was replaced by 
the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI),63 however without any budget line 
specifically devoted to conflict resolution in Georgia.64 In the context of this paper, 
the term ENPI will be synonymously used for both the ENPI and the ENI between 2008 
and 2015. 
 
Following the August war, the EU in 2008-2009 allocated €32 million through the IfS for 
projects to facilitate the return and reintegration of IDPs,65 an amount that was 
increased in 2010-2011 by €58 million. 66  In 2010 the Confidence Building Early 
Response Mechanism (COBERM) was established under the IfS, financing small-scale 
projects between communities in Georgia and Abkhazia,67 with the main objective 
of fostering a peaceful transformation of the conflicts and promoting people-to-
people contacts.68 In 2012 and 2013, the IfS assistance significantly decreased to €16 
and €8,5 million respectively, which was devoted to projects supporting confidence-
building measures in the breakaway regions and capacity building to the State 
Ministry for Reintegration.69 For the period of 2014-2020, the IfS was succeeded by the 
Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP).70 In the context of this research, 
the term IfS will be synonymously used for both the IfS and the IcSP in 2008-2015. 
 
60 European Commission, European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument Georgia – 
National Indicative Programme 2007-2010, pp. 4, 14-15. 
61 Whitman & Wolff, op. cit., p. 91. 
62 European Commission, “European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument Georgia – 
National Indicative Programme 2011-2013”, p. 10. 
63 “How is the ENP financed?”, EEAS. 
64 European Commission, Programming of the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) – 
2014-2020, p. 5. 
65 “Instrument for Stability (IfS)”, Delegation of the European Union to Georgia. 
66 European Commission, 2010 Annual Report on the Instrument for Stability PART 1, Brussels, 16 
August 2011, p. 37 & European Commission, 2011 Annual Report on the Instrument for Stability 
Volume 1, Brussels, 24 July 2012, p. 38. 
67  European Commission, 2010 Annual Report on the Instrument for Stability, Brussels, 16 
August 2011, p. 6. 
68 European Union Delegation to Georgia, EU Assistance to People Affected by Conflict in 
Georgia, op. cit., p. 20. 
69 European Commission, 2012 Annual Report on the Instrument for Stability Volume 1, Brussels, 
27 July 2013, pp. 40-42, & European Commission, 2013 Annual Report on the Instrument for 
Stability PART 2/3, Brussels, 2 December 2014, pp. 16-18. 
70 “Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace, preventing conflict around the world”, 
European Commission, 20 March 2015.  16 
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A differentiated, balanced and patient approach to conflict resolution?  
The following qualitative case study examines to what degree the accumulated 
contributions of the EUMM, the EUSR for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia, 
the ENPI and the IfS have contributed to the achievement of each of the policy 
objectives of conflict prevention, conflict transformation, international conflict 
management and conflict settlement.  
Conflict prevention 
In the months following the war in August 2008, the security situation remained tense 
and fragile in the areas around the conflict zones with fatal shootings, attacks and 
car bombs, 71 and concerns for a resumption of hostilities were widespread. 72 In 
October 2008, the EUMM confirmed the withdrawal of Russian troops from territories 
adjacent to the breakaway regions. However, a substantial number of Russian troops 
were to remain in the breakaway regions,73 and the Russian military continues also in 
2015 to violate the fifth point of the six-point Agreement.74 In June 2009 the security 
situation deteriorated,75 and in the upcoming months a considerable number of 
violent incidents erupted with the potential of igniting a wider confrontation 
between the conflict parties. 76  Nevertheless, the security situation has thereafter 
somewhat stabilised and the situation along the ABLs has been reported to be 
relatively calm,77 without any major incidents or resumption of hostilities.78 
 
Both academics and policy makers have pointed to the indispensible role the EUMM 
has played in deterring and preventing any further escalation of hostilities by 
facilitating the separation of the conflict parties and monitoring the implementation 
of the ceasefire.79 By investigating shooting incidents and kidnappings in the conflict 
areas as well as by establishing contacts with all the conflict parties, the EUMM is 
71 “CrisisWatch Database”, International Crisis Group, 1 October 2008 - 1 February 2009. 
72 “EUMM – European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia”, op. cit. 
73 “CrisisWatch Database”, op. cit., 1 November 2008. 
74 “EUMM – European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia”, op. cit. 
75 “CrisisWatch Database”, op. cit., 1 July 2009. 
76 IIFFMCG, op. cit., p. 37. 
77 International Alert, op. cit., p. 89. 
78 Interview with an EU official, EUMM, via e-mail, 21 March 2015.  
79 Popescu, EU Foreign Policy and Post-Soviet Conflicts, op. cit., p. 90 & interview with an EU 
official, Office of the EUSR for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia, EEAS, Brussels, 12 
March 2015 & interview with a Georgian official, Mission of Georgia to the European Union, 
Brussels, 18 March 2015 & interview with Sergi Kapanadze, Former Deputy Foreign Minister and 
Chief Negotiator of Georgia in the GID, via Skype, 25 March 2015.  17 
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claimed to “doubtlessly” have contributed to contain and prevent the outbreak of 
violence. 80 However, the denied access to the breakaway regions prevents the 
EUMM from monitoring the situation on the other side of the ABLs81 and hampers it 
from receiving comprehensive and impartial information about the situation on the 
ground. 82  The preventive role of the GID has also been highlighted, as the 
representatives of the conflict parties in this venue might be held responsible for 
incidents on the ground, a scenario they rather wish to avoid.83  
 
In the framework of the GID, discussions have been undertaken about the need for 
solid security guarantees in the region. 84 Since September 2009, the parties have 
been working on a deal on the non-use of force but continuously disagree on the 
issue of international security arrangements.85 In principle, all parties agree to work 
on legally binding documents, but the opinions significantly differ regarding the form 
of the agreement, who should sign it, who should oversee its implementation as well 
as what international norms and underlying agreements it should encompass. The 
EUSR has together with the other co-chairs argued that such an agreement must be 
part of a general security agreement that provides for the separation of forces, 
dialogue between the parties as well as monitoring and control mechanisms to 
oversee the parties’ compliance.86 Russia and the breakaway regions have insisted 
that agreements on the non-use of force are signed between Georgia and 
Abkhazia and between Georgia and South Ossetia. However, Georgia has claimed 
that such an agreement can only be signed between Georgia and Russia and that it 
should envisage a de-occupation of the breakaway regions.87 As Russia continuously 
insists that it does not constitute a party to the conflict, it has refused to sign an 
agreement,88 and the GID has to date failed to deliver any concrete results to this 
end.89 
 
80 Merlingen & Ostrauskaite, op. cit., pp. 286-288. 
81 Ibid., p. 288. 
82 Interview with Bruno Coppieters, Professor in Political Science, Free University of Brussels, 
Brussels, 9 March 2015. 
83 Interview with an EU official, Office of the EUSR, op. cit. 
84 International Alert, op. cit., p. 39. 
85 “CrisisWatch Database”, op. cit., 1 October 2009. 
86 International Alert, op. cit., p. 40. 
87 “Sixth Round of Geneva Talks ‘Sometimes Difficult’ but ‘Constructive’”, Civil.ge, 2 July 2009. 
88 “CrisisWatch Database”, op. cit., 3 January 2011. 
89 “Press Communiqué of the Co-Chairs of the Geneva International Discussions”, OSCE, 1 July 
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Even though the denied access to the breakaway regions prevents the EUMM from 
fully implementing its mandate, the mission is still widely considered to have 
significantly stabilised the situation and prevented an escalation of hostilities and 
open violence. In addition, the EUSR has actively promoted and contributed to 
discussions in the GID on agreements on the non-use of force and international 
security arrangements, even though they have yet failed to deliver any concrete 
results in this regard. When taking the above into account, the EU’s conflict resolution 
policies are considered to have contributed to the achievement of the policy 
objective of conflict prevention to a great degree. 
Conflict transformation 
Some scholars have highlighted the EUMM’s role in seeking to establish conditions on 
the ground that are conducive to the undertaking of confidence-building efforts 
between the conflict parties. After Russian troops had withdrawn from the areas 
adjacent to the breakaway regions in October 2008, the EUMM started to 
increasingly focus on contributing to building confidence between the parties across 
the ABLs. However, the EUMM has not been able to do more than monitoring and 
reporting on developments on the ground as well as establishing communication 
channels between the actors, falling short of reinvigorating the peace process and 
rebuilding confidence between the actors along the ABLs.90 “Significant work” still 
remains to be done by the EUMM in terms of confidence building,91 where the 
access to the breakaway regions is an essential element for progress towards this 
end.92  
 
Even though the EU has enabled the parties to meet and come together through 
the GID,93 the track record of the GID has been limited in terms of bringing the 
parties’ positions and interests closer together,94 and there is currently no strong force 
for progress towards this end.95 No tangible outcome has so far been reached as 
90 Merlingen & Ostrauskaite, op. cit., pp. 287-288. 
91  “EUMM – European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia”, op. cit., & interview with a 
Georgian official, op. cit. 
92 “EUMM – European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia”, op. cit., & interview with Bruno 
Coppieters, op. cit. 
93 Interview with an EU official, Office of the EUSR, op. cit. 
94 Interview with Thomas de Waal, Senior Associate Russia and Eurasia, Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, Brussels, 18 March 2015. 
95 Interview with Bruno Coppieters, op. cit.  19 
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regards agreements on the non-use of force or international security arrangements,96 
and the parties’ positions remain incompatible.97 Given how entrenched the parties’ 
positions are, there is not much leeway for the EU or any other external actor to bring 
the positions of the parties closer together.98 Despite the limited results, the parties still 
to some extent recognise the importance of maintaining the GID as the only political 
forum in which all of them participate.99 The GID have also been useful in terms of 
shedding light on the parties’ positions and interests and in increasing the 
understanding among the participants, and the degree of animosity is not the same 
as in 2008.100 The work of the EUSR with regular visits to Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
has also been crucial in maintaining links with the breakaway regions and in 
upholding some relations.101  
 
On the proposal by the EUSR, the EU in December 2009 approved the so-called 
‘engagement without recognition’ strategy, with the central objective to de-isolate 
the breakaway regions and to provide an alternative perspective to the 
predominant Russian one. Since South Ossetia has practically remained closed for 
international assistance after the August war in 2008, the implementation of the EU’s 
strategy has in this region been postponed. 102 The strategy has, however, been 
criticised for not being reinforced by sufficient actions on the ground,103 and that it 
has rather turned into a strategy of “non-engagement”.104 Yet, it is difficult for the EU 
to engage with the breakaway regions without coming close to anything resembling 
state building or the strengthening of the de facto authorities, as this would be 
interpreted by Georgia as an implicit recognition of the entities.105 The EU is often 
perceived as being biased towards Georgia, which undermines its relations and 
96 “Press Communiqué of the Co-Chairs of the Geneva International Discussions”, OSCE, op. 
cit. 
97 “Thirtieth Round of Geneva Talks”, Civil.ge, 11 December 2014. 
98 Interview with Nicu Popescu, Senior Analyst, EUISS, via Skype, 10 March 2015. 
99 Merlingen & Ostrauskaite, op. cit., p. 291. 
100 Interview with Sergi Kapanadze, op. cit. 
101 Interview with Thomas de Waal, op. cit. 
102 F. Smolnik, “Lessons Learned? The EU and the South Caucasus De Facto States”, Caucasus 
Analytical Digest, no. 35-36, 15 February 2012, pp. 2-3. 
103 Interview with Thomas de Waal, op. cit., & with an EU official, Office of the EUSR, op. cit. 
104 L. Kvarchelia, “Perceptions of the EU in Abkhazia and prospects for the EU-Abkhazia 
engagement”, Analytical report 2012, Conciliation Resources, 2012, p. 8. 
105 Interview with Bruno Coppieters, op. cit., & with an EU official, Office of the EUSR, op. cit., & 
with Thomas de Waal, op. cit.  20 
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engagement with the breakaway regions106 and in turn contributes to the further drift 
of the entities towards Russia.107 Some Abkhazians have claimed that if the EU were 
to take a neutral stance on the conflict, the Abkhaz society would not regard the 
EU’s position as a threat and would hence trust it more and potentially allow it 
access to the Abkhaz side of the ABL.108  
 
The EU’s post-conflict rehabilitation assistance through the ENPI and the IfS has to 
some extent helped to prevent a further isolation of Abkhazia from Western 
countries, whereas South Ossetia has refused to accept any EU funding. 109  The 
COBERM has been highlighted as a valuable tool in terms of conflict 
transformation,110 but the overall impact of the EU-funded small-scale confidence-
building projects has been marginal at best.111 The Georgian Law on Occupied 
Territories imposes legal restrictions on the EU-funded projects in the breakaway 
regions112 and is perceived by Abkhazia and South Ossetia as an aggressive policy 
by Tbilisi. The EU reported in 2011 that the positions of Georgia, South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia were growing even further apart, 113  and that if a “practical way 
forward”114 is not found regarding the implementation of the Law on Occupied 
Territories, it will negatively impede on on-going and future EU-funded confidence-
building projects in the breakaway regions.115 
 
The EU has made several efforts to bring the conflict parties closer together and to 
change the degree of incompatibility between their respective positions, through 
political negotiations in the GID, by trying to create equal opportunities for people in 
the breakaway regions with the ‘engagement without recognition’ strategy as well 
as by ENPI and IfS-funded confidence-building projects. However, the impact of the 
106 Interview with a Senior Associate Eurasia, German Institute for International and Security 
Affairs, via e-mail, 30 March 2015. 
107 Frichova Grono, op. cit., p. 26. 
108 Kvarchelia, op. cit., p. 8. 
109 Popescu, EU Foreign Policy and Post-Soviet Conflicts, op. cit., p. 93. 
110 Interview with a Senior Associate Eurasia, op. cit., & with a Georgian official, op. cit., & with 
Sergi Kapanadze, op. cit. 
111 Merlingen & Ostrauskaite, op. cit., p. 283. 
112 European Commission, 2010 Annual Report on the Instrument for Stability PART 1, op. cit., p. 
38. 
113 European Commission, 2011 Annual Report on the Instrument for Stability Volume 1, op. 
cit., pp. 39-41. 
114 European Commission, 2010 Annual Report on the Instrument for Stability PART 1, op. cit., p. 
39. 
115 Ibid., pp. 38-39.  21 
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EU’s efforts has been limited where the practical conditions on the ground as well as 
the overall conflict environment hampered activities contributing to conflict trans-
formation, leading to a vicious cycle. The positions of the conflict parties remain 
locked and incompatible where the identities and interests of the parties have not 
been brought closer together to any significant extent. When taking this into 
account, the accumulated contributions of the EU’s conflict resolution policies are 
considered to have contributed to the achievement of the policy objective of 
conflict transformation to a poor degree. 
International conflict management 
Tensions between the conflict parties have at several times arisen since the ceasefire 
was reached in August 2008, with hostile rhetoric, provocations and accusations of 
increased military presence along the ABLs, 116  which have at times generated 
speculations over a possible renewed conflict.117 In this regard, the GID has served as 
a useful forum for mediation efforts where the co-chairs have managed to generate 
an overall calm and stable conflict situation, despite persistent tensions between the 
conflict parties.118 The GID has consistently been marked by considerable disagree-
ments between the parties and a lack of tangible progress, and they have at several 
times ended up in deadlocks and disruptions.119 Yet, due to efforts made by the EUSR 
and the other co-chairs, the discussions have repeatedly been reconvened.120 The 
informing role played by the EUMM has also been highlighted as an essential 
counterforce to de-stabilising activities and as a deterrent to a further escalation of 
conflicts.121 By investigating accusations made and reporting on the developments 
on the ground, the EUMM observers constitute an important source of information, as 
there would otherwise only be the partial statements by the parties that could 
potentially provoke an escalation of conflicts. However, the EUMM’s capability to 
fully monitor the situation on the ground is, as previously mentioned, limited by its 
116 “CrisisWatch Database”, op. cit., 1 April-1 May 2009, 1 July-1 October 2013, & “Sixteenth 
Round of Geneva Talks”, Civil.ge, 8 June 2011. 
117 “Merabishvili: Russian Attack Ruled Out in Near Future”, Civil.ge, 7 March 2009, & “Sixteenth 
Round of Geneva Talks”, op. cit. 
118 “Tenth Round of Geneva Talks”, Civil.ge, 20 March 2010, & “Press Communiqué of the Co-
Chairs of the Geneva International Discussions”, Consilium, 4 October 2011, & “Press 
Communiqué of the Co-Chairs of Geneva Discussions”, EUMM, 6 November 2013. 
119 “Tense Talks in Eleventh Round of Geneva Discussions”, Civil.ge, 9 June 2010, & “Sixteenth 
Round of Geneva Talks”, op. cit., & “Press Communiqué of the Co-Chairs of Geneva 
Discussions”, EUMM, 18 June 2014. 
120 “Twelfth Round of Geneva Talks”, Civil.ge, 26 July 2010, & “Press Communiqué of the Co-
Chairs of the Geneva International Discussions”, Consilium, op. cit. 
121 Interview with an EU official, Office of the EUSR, op. cit., & with Sergi Kapanadze, op. cit.  22 
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denied access to the breakaway regions. 122  Additionally, the increasing 
demarcation activities by Russia along the South Ossetian ABL since 2012123 and the 
recent signatures of the treaties between Russia and the breakaway regions have 
prompted a tense and difficult discussion environment in the GID.124 
 
In the present situation with confrontations between Georgia and Russia, it is difficult 
for the EU to bring Georgia and the breakaway regions closer together in terms of 
creating incentives for a settlement,125 where the attempts by the EU have only 
achieved highly limited progress.126 The EU has tried to exercise leverage on Georgia 
to make it more open in its attitude towards the breakaway regions127 and the policy 
of engagement without recognition has to some extent strengthened Abkhazia by 
preventing it from a further isolation from Western countries.128 Nevertheless, the EU’s 
support of the Georgian position in terms of its territorial integrity and the non-
recognition of the breakaway entities have in the latter led to a perception of the EU 
as being biased towards Georgia. 129  Consequently, the EU lacks the necessary 
leverage in Abkhazia and South Ossetia to be able to create incentives for a 
settlement.130 The breakaway entities’ confidence in the EU’s capacity to mediate 
and to deliver an outcome that is acceptable to them is considerably low due to the 
very same reasons. In addition, political divisions within the EU prevent it from 
undertaking a strong policy line with the potential of impacting the dynamics and 
the balance of power between the conflict parties, and could potentially also block 
progress towards a negotiated settlement. 131  The ability of the EU to create 
incentives for a settlement is, however, also greatly dependent on the will of the 
parties, where the different perspectives on the conflicts remain entrenched and 
hinder progress to this end.132  
122 Interview with Bruno Coppieters, op. cit. 
123  “EUMM concerned about situation at South Ossetian Administrative Boundary Line”, 
EUMM, 21 September 2012, & “CrisisWatch Database”, op. cit., 1 July-1 Oct 2013. 
124 “Thirty-First Round of Geneva Talks”, Civil.ge, 19 March 2015. 
125 Interview with Bruno Coppieters, op. cit. 
126 Interview with a Senior Associate Eurasia, op. cit., & with an EU official, Office of the EUSR, 
op. cit. 
127 Frichova Grono, op. cit., p. 23, & interview with an EU official, Office of the EUSR, op. cit.  
128 Interview with Bruno Coppieters, op. cit. 
129 Interview with a Senior Associate Eurasia, op. cit., & with an EU official, Office of the EUSR, 
op. cit. 
130 Interview with Nicu Popescu, op. cit., & with a Senior Associate Eurasia, op. cit., & with 
Thomas de Waal, op. cit. 
131 Frichova Grono, op. cit., pp. 23-31. 
132 Interview with an EU official, Office of the EUSR, op. cit.  23 
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The GID has fallen short of generating much concrete progress in terms of 
agreements between the conflict parties, and it has at several times been disrupted 
or ended up in deadlocks. However, the EUSR has played an essential role in keeping 
the discussions on-going, and the GID with the input of the EUMM reports and 
investigations have at several occasions managed to contain the potential 
escalation of renewed conflicts by offsetting provocations. Yet, the continued 
Russian demarcation activities and the recent signature of the treaties between 
Russia and the breakaway regions remain issues of great concern. No speculations 
have yet been made regarding a possible escalation of conflict, but the 
deteriorated relations between Georgia and Russia hamper the EU’s ability to create 
incentives for a settlement of the conflicts. The EU additionally lacks the necessary 
leverage and ability to change the balance of power between the conflict parties. 
The accumulated contributions of the EU’s conflict resolution policies have hence 
contributed to the achievement of one of the elements of international conflict 
management, that is, to contain the escalation of conflicts. However, taking into 
account that they have failed to create incentives for a settlement – the second 
element –, the EU’s conflict resolution policies are considered to have contributed to 
the achievement of the policy objective of international conflict management to 
some degree. 
Conflict settlement 
No negotiations on the international status of the breakaway regions have so far 
been undertaken between the parties, and there is currently no concrete 
perspective for a conflict settlement.133 Some authors claim that the time for status 
negotiations between Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia has passed and that 
the breakaway regions are likely to remain de facto independent and protected by 
Russia.134 The prospects for finding a settlement of the conflicts are as distant as they 
were before the August war in 2008, but the Russian recognition of the breakaway 
regions’ independence has caused a new line of thinking135 where it is impossible for 
Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Russia to go back to the status quo prior to the war.136 
Georgia regards the breakaway regions as illegally occupied territories, and 
133 Interview with Bruno Coppieters, op. cit., & with Nicu Popescu, op. cit., & with Thomas de 
Waal, op. cit., & with an EU official, EEAS, Brussels, 11 March 2015. 
134 Merlingen & Ostrauskaite, op. cit., p. 289. 
135 Interview with Sergi Kapanadze, op. cit. 
136 Frichova Grono, op. cit., pp. 30-31.  24 
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considers only a settlement that is underpinned by the principles of territorial integrity 
and sovereignty of its internationally recognised borders acceptable.137  
 
The perspectives on the conflicts remain very different. Russia, on the one hand, sees 
the conflicts as between Georgia and the breakaway regions where it only plays the 
role of a security guarantor similar to that of the EU. Georgia, on the other hand, 
perceives the conflict as between Russia and herself with Russia being the occupier 
and aggressor.138 To some extent all of the parties have an interest in maintaining the 
conflicts, since they attract international attention and engagement in Georgia,139 
are used by Russia as a function of its policy towards Georgia and the West,140 and 
more or less imply independence for the breakaway regions.141 The interest to find a 
solution to the conflicts has also moved down on the political agenda of all relevant 
actors. The attention of the EU has been drawn away from the region by the 
financial crisis, the ‘Arab Spring’ and most lately the crisis in Ukraine.142 However, also 
the lack of political will among the conflict parties weakens the motivation and 
interests of the EU to direct attention and resources to find a settlement of the 
conflicts.143 
 
The GID’s lack of progress and tangible outcomes has further on led some critics to 
claim that “a means to an end has become an end in itself”.144 However, a potential 
future settlement could still be found in the format of the GID since they gather all of 
the relevant actors.145 In this regard, the EU plays an important role in upholding and 
maintaining the GID, 146  but without the political will of the participants to find 
compromises and mutually acceptable solutions it is impossible for the EU to achieve 
any progress towards finding a settlement.147 The EU has further on been identified as 
the main driving force and the most influential co-chair in the GID.148 This is much due 
to the fact that the EU has more room for manoeuvre and can be more outspoken 
137 Interview with a Georgian official, op. cit. 
138 Interview with an EU official, Office of the EUSR, op. cit. 
139 Interview with an EU official, EEAS, op. cit. 
140 Interview with a Senior Associate Eurasia, op. cit. 
141 Interview with an EU official, Office of the EUSR, op. cit. 
142 Interview with a Senior Associate Eurasia, op. cit., & with Thomas de Waal, op. cit. & with 
Sergi Kapanadze, op. cit. 
143 Interview with Sergi Kapanadze, op. cit. 
144 Smolnik, op. cit., p. 3. 
145 Interview with Sergi Kapanadze, op. cit. 
146 Ibid. 
147 Interview with Thomas de Waal, op. cit., & International Alert, op. cit., p. 46. 
148 Interview with Thomas de Waal, op. cit., & with Sergi Kapanadze, op. cit.  25 
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compared to the UN and the OSCE, which are bound by the position of Russia.149 
Yet, the EU’s position as mediator is weakened by its support for Georgia’s territorial 
integrity, a partiality that goes against the red lines of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and 
Russia.150  
 
There seems to be a resounding consensus on the lack of a current perspective to 
find a settlement of the conflicts as the perceptions and positions of the parties still 
remain too incompatible and entrenched. The EU has not facilitated or supported 
any negotiations on the international status of the breakaway regions, neither has an 
agreement by the parties on a common institutional framework been reached. 
However, this is largely due to the fact that the overall conflict environment has not 
been conducive to the undertaking of such negotiations. In this light, the EU’s 
conflict policies are considered to have contributed to the achievement of the 
policy objective of conflict settlement to a poor degree. 
 
Conclusion 
A summary of the main findings of the qualitative case study is below presented in 
the form of a table. 
 
Table 1: The contributions of the EU’s conflict resolution policies in Georgia 2008-2015 
Conflict resolution To a great degree To some degree To a poor degree 
Conflict prevention X   
Conflict transformation   X 
International conflict 
management 
 X  
Conflict settlement   X 
Source: compiled by the author. 
 
The main contribution of the EU’s conflict resolution policies in Georgia in 2008-2015 is 
considered by both academics and policy makers to have been within the policy 
objective of conflict prevention. In this context, the efforts of the EU have to a great 
degree prevented the incompatibility of positions between the conflict parties from 
escalating to open violence. The role of the EUMM has been an essential element in 
stabilising the security situation and as a deterrent to a further escalation of hostilities, 
149 Interview with Thomas de Waal, op. cit., & with an EU official, Office of the EUSR, op. cit. 
150 Frichova Grono, op. cit., p. 34.  26 
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even though the denied access to the breakaway regions continues to prevent the 
mission from fully implementing its mandate. The short-term goal within this policy 
objective has consequently been achieved with no open violence until present time. 
Nevertheless, the establishment of a post-settlement security mechanism still remains 
to be realised.  
 
Yet, the progress made in the area of conflict prevention has not affected the work 
done by the EU in the field of conflict transformation, where the EU’s conflict 
resolution policies have only to a poor degree contributed to the achievement of 
the policy objective. The efforts of the GID in terms of bringing the parties’ views and 
interests closer together have only generated highly limited results where the 
positions of the parties to a large extent remain incompatible. The perceived bias of 
the EU towards Georgia has undermined its relations and engagement with the 
breakaway regions. The Georgian Law on Occupied Territories additionally restricts 
the implementation of ENPI and IfS-funded projects for confidence building. The EU’s 
profile in international conflict management, namely the support of Georgia’s 
position for territorial integrity and non-recognition of the breakaway entities, has in 
this regard weakened the EU’s position in the field of conflict transformation. The 
incompatible and entrenched positions between the parties also negatively impact 
on conflict prevention, where an agreement on a post-settlement security 
mechanism yet remains to be reached. However, the long-term timeframe required 
for the realisation of the policy objective of conflict transformation must not be 
overlooked and perhaps progress in this area can only be expected in a more 
distant future.  
 
The progress made in the field of conflict prevention has to some extent been 
reproduced in the area of international conflict management, where the EU’s 
conflict resolution policies have contained the escalation of renewed conflicts. The 
EUSR has in this regard played an essential role in maintaining the GID despite 
substantial disagreements between the parties. The GID has served as a counter 
force to de-stabilising activities on the ground and to hostile rhetoric between the 
parties that could potentially have escalated into further conflicts. However, the lack 
of progress in terms of conflict transformation negatively impacts on international 
conflict management where the scope for the EU to find incentives for a settlement 
remains highly limited due to the incompatible and entrenched positions of the 
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parties. In this context, the EU’s conflict resolution policies have failed to create 
incentives for a settlement as the EU lacks the necessary leverage on the parties and 
the ability to change the balance of power between them.  
 
The lack of progress in the fields of conflict transformation and international conflict 
management to a large extent explains why no negotiations on the international 
status of the breakaway regions have been undertaken. No concrete perspectives 
for a settlement of the conflicts presently exist and the EU’s conflict resolution policies 
have only to a poor degree contributed to its achievement. The incompatible 
positions and the different perspectives of the conflicts among the parties currently 
prevent a mutually acceptable solution to the question of status, and the lack of 
incentives for finding a settlement continues to hamper any progress towards this 
end. The prospect to find a settlement in the format of the GID still exists, however 
without the political will of the parties such attempts will not prove fruitful. Yet the 
lack of progress in the field of conflict settlement has so far not generated any 
violent confrontation or escalation of conflict between the parties. Moreover, the 
objective of conflict settlement is the final end of the process of conflict resolution 
and patience is hence needed if progress in the other fields of conflict resolution is to 
generate more favourable conditions to successfully reach a conflict settlement. 
 
According to Coppieters, a differentiated, balanced and patient approach to 
conflict resolution should in principle allow for positive results to be achieved in the 
shorter and the longer term.151 What has become evident in this case study is the 
interrelatedness of the policy objectives where the emphasis or progress of one 
policy objective clearly has an effect on the others. The lack of progress in terms of 
conflict transformation has had a direct impact on progress in the other policy areas 
and in order to contribute to the overall process of conflict resolution, the EU needs 
to increasingly focus and prioritise its efforts in the field of conflict transformation. The 
profile of the EU in the field of international conflict management might come at a 
too large expense of conflict transformation policies, worsening the overall prospects 
for conflict resolution. The EU should try and find ways to avoid this clash between the 
policy objectives, and what the EU could do in this context is to continue to push the 
Georgian government to increase its engagement with the breakaway regions and 
to ease up the Law on Occupied Territories. Nevertheless, the EU needs to keep in 
151 Coppieters, op. cit., p. 28.  28 
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mind the specific timeframes for the realisation of each of the policy objectives. 
Whereas the policies within the different fields should be pursued in parallel and 
closely linked to each other, they must not be suspended or held contingent on 
progress or failures in other areas of conflict resolution. 
 
The aim of this paper has been to explore to what extent the EU has impacted on 
the conflict resolution process of Georgia’s secessionist conflicts in 2008-2015, and 
whether this could be related to the objectives, priorities and time perspectives of 
the EU’s conflict resolution policies. The empirical findings of the case study show that 
the EU’s conflict resolution policies to a great degree have contributed to the 
achievement of the objective of conflict prevention. However, the EU’s efforts have 
only furthered the realisation of the objective of international conflict management 
to some degree, and to the achievement of the objectives of conflict transformation 
and conflict settlement to a poor degree. When taking this into account, the paper 
argues that the EU only to a limited extent has impacted on the conflict resolution 
process of Georgia’s secessionist conflicts in 2008-2015, which can be related to the 
objectives, priorities and time perspectives of the EU’s conflict resolution policies.  
 
Beyond the empirical contribution filling into the current research gap on the EU’s 
role in conflict resolution, the paper also intends to provide a theoretical framework 
of how the EU’s involvement and impact could be assessed and understood. 
Coppieters’ differentiated approach has in this paper proved a useful analytical tool 
to describe and assess the impact of the EU’s conflict resolution policies, confirming 
its continued validity as one possible analytical framework in the case of Georgia, 
whose application might also prove useful in other conflict resolution contexts. 
Moreover, the findings of this research may help inform the EU’s future conflict 
resolution policies in Georgia, and potentially as well in other conflict resolution 
contexts where the EU is active or about to be engaged. To conclude, in order for 
the EU to have a true impact on the conflict resolution process of Georgia’s 
secessionist conflicts and to achieve positive results in both the shorter and longer 
term, it needs to undertake a differentiated, balanced and patient approach to 
conflict resolution. 
 29 
Emilia Jeppsson 
Bibliography 
 
Books and articles 
Asmus, D. Ronald, A Little War That Shook the World, Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. 
Cornell, E. Svante & Fredrick Starr, “Introduction”, in Cornell, E. Svante & Fredrick Starr (eds.), 
The Guns of August 2008 – Russia’s War in Georgia, Armonk, M.E. Sharpe, 2009, pp. 3-9. 
Merlingen, Michael & Rasa Ostrauskaite, “EU Peacebuilding in Georgia: Limits and 
Achievements”, in Blockmans, Steven, Jan Wouters & Tom Ruys (eds.), The European Union 
and Peacebuidling, The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2010, pp. 269-293. 
Popescu, Nicu, “EU and the Eastern Neighbourhood: Reluctant Involvement in Conflict 
Resolution”, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 14, no. 4, November 2009, pp. 457-477. 
Popescu, Nicu, EU Foreign Policy and Post-Soviet Conflicts, London, Routledge, 2011. 
Smolnik, Franziska, “Lessons Learned? The EU and the South Caucasus De Facto States”, 
Caucasus Analytical Digest, nos. 35-36, 15 February 2012, pp. 2-6. 
Whitman, G. Richard & Stefan Wolff, “The EU as a conflict manager? The Case of Georgia 
and its implications”, International Affairs, vol. 86, no. 1, 2010, pp. 87-107. 
 
Reports, studies and papers 
Boonstra, Jos & Laure Delcour, “A broken region: evaluating EU policies in the South 
Caucasus”, FRIDE Policy Briefs, no. 193, Madrid, January 2015. 
Coppieters, Bruno, “The EU and Georgia: time perspectives in conflict resolution”, European 
Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) Occasional Paper, no. 70, Paris, December 2007. 
Cornell, E. Svante, Johanna Popjanevski & Niklas Nilsson, “Russia’s War in Georgia: Causes 
and Implications for Georgia and the World”, Policy Paper Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & 
Silk Road Studies Program, Brussels, August 2008, pp. 3-43. 
Frichova Grono, Magdalena, “Georgia’s Conflicts: What Role for the EU as Mediator?”, IFP 
Mediation Cluster – International Alert, London, March 2010, pp. 4-39. 
Kvarchelia, Liana, “Perceptions of the EU in Abkhazia and prospects for the EU-Abkhazia 
engagement”, Analytical Report 2012, Conciliation Resources, London, 2012. 
 
Documents 
Council of the European Union, “Council Decision (2011/518/CFSP) of 25 August 2011 
appointing the European Union Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis 
in Georgia”, Official Journal of the European Union, L221, 27 August 2011, pp. 5-7. 
Council of the European Union, “Council Joint Action (2008/736/CFSP) of 15 September 2008 
on the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia, EUMM Georgia”, Official Journal of the 
European Union, L248, 17 September 2008, pp. 26-31. 
Council of the European Union, “Council Joint Action (2008/760/CFSP) of 25 September 2008 
appointing the European Union Special Representative for the crisis in Georgia”, Official 
Journal of the European Union, L259, 27 September 2008, pp. 16-18. 
Council of the European Union, Press Release – Extraordinary meeting General Affairs and 
External Relations, 12453/08 (Presse 236), Brussels, 13 August 2008.  
European Commission, 2010 Annual Report on the Instrument for Stability, Brussels, 16 August 
2011. 
European Commission, 2010 Annual Report on the Instrument for Stability PART 1, Brussels, 16 
August 2011. 
 30 
EU Diplomacy Paper 6/2015 
European Commission, 2011 Annual Report on the Instrument for Stability Volume 1, Brussels, 
24 July 2012. 
European Commission, 2012 Annual Report on the Instrument for Stability Volume 1, Brussels, 
27 July 2013. 
European Commission, 2013 Annual Report on the Instrument for Stability PART 2/3, Brussels, 2 
December 2014.  
European Commission, European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument Georgia – 
National Indicative Programme 2007-2010, publication date unknown. 
European Commission, European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument Georgia – 
National Indicative Programme 2011-2013, publication date unknown. 
European Commission, Programming of the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) – 
2014-2020, publication date unknown. 
European External Action Service, European Union Special Representative for the South 
Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia, Brussels, 2 February 2015. 
European Union Delegation to Georgia, EU Assistance to People Affected by Conflict in 
Georgia – Overview, Tbilisi, October 2011. 
Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (IIFFMCG), Report 
Volume I, September 2009. 
International Alert, International Engagement in the Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict Resolution 
Process, May 2010. 
Saakashvili, Mikheil, The President of Georgia, The Law of Georgia on Occupied Territories, 
Tbilisi, 23 October 2008, retrieved 20 April 2015, http://www.smr.gov.ge/docs/doc216.pdf.  
  
Electronic sources 
“CrisisWatch Database”, International Crisis Group, 1 September 2008-5 January 2015, 
retrieved 7 April 2015, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/crisiswatch/crisiswatch-
database.aspx?CountryIDs=%7b75D22970-7B5D-499D-AEE6-E011F06F7077%7d&page=1.   
“EU-Georgia relations”, European External Action Service (EEAS), publication date unknown, 
retrieved 9 April 2015, http://eeas.europa.eu/georgia/index_en.htm.  
“EUMM – European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia”, European Union Monitoring Mission 
in Georgia (EUMM), publication date unknown, retrieved 8 April 2014, 
http://www.eumm.eu/en/about_eumm/?print=yes.  
 “EUMM concerned about situation at South Ossetian Administrative Boundary Line”, 
European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM), 21 September 2012, retrieved 16 April, 
http://www.eumm.eu/en/press_and_public_information/press_releases/3329.  
“How is the ENP financed?”, European External Action Service (EEAS), publication date 
unknown, retrieved 9 April 2015, http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/how-is-it-financed/index_en.htm.  
“Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace, preventing conflict around the world”, 
European Commission, 20 March 2015, retrieved 1 May 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/ 
fpi/what-we-do/instrument_contributing_to_stability_and_peace_ en.htm.  
“Instrument for Stability (IfS)”, Delegation of the European Union to Georgia, publication date 
unknown, retrieved 9 April 2015, http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/georgia/eu_georgia/ 
tech_financial_cooperation/instruments/instruments_ifs/index_en.htm.  
“Merabishvili: Russian Attack Ruled Out in Near Future”, Civil.ge, 7 March 2009, retrieved 21 
April 2015, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=20525.  
“Moscow, Sokhumi Sign Treaty on Alliance and Strategic Partnership”, Civil.ge, 24 November 
2014, retrieved 28 April 2015, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=27845. 
 31 
Emilia Jeppsson 
“Overview”, Delegation of the European Union to Georgia, publication date unknown, 
retrieved 11 April 2015, http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/georgia/projects/overview/ 
index_en.htm.  
“Pact Brings South Ossetia Closer to Russia”, The Wall Street Journal, 18 March 2015, retrieved 
7 April 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-tightens-control-over-breakaway-georgian-
region-of-south-ossetia-1426688743. 
“Press Communiqué of the Co-Chairs of Geneva Discussions”, European Union Monitoring 
Mission in Georgia (EUMM), 6 November 2013, retrieved 22 April 2015, http://eumm.eu/en/ 
press_and_public_information/press_releases/4062/.  
“Press Communiqué of the Co-Chairs of Geneva Discussions”, European Union Monitoring 
Mission in Georgia (EUMM), 18 June 2014, retrieved 23 April 2015, http://www.eumm.eu/en/ 
press_and_public_information/press_releases/4580/?year=2014&month=12.  
“Press Communiqué of the Co-Chairs of the Geneva International Discussions”, Consilium, 4 
October 2011, retrieved 22 April 2015, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/ 
cmsUpload/Geneva17-Press%20release.4.10.2011.pdf.  
“Press Communiqué of the Co-Chairs of the Geneva International Discussions”, Organization 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), 1 July 2015, retrieved 8 July 2015, 
http://www.osce.org/cio/168021.  
“Russia Backs Independence of Georgian Enclaves”, The New York Times, 26 August 2008, 
retrieved 6 April 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/27/world/europe/27russia.html? 
pagewanted=all.  
“Sixteenth Round of Geneva Talks”, Civil.ge, 8 June 2011, retrieved 21 April 2015, 
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=23590.  
“Sixth Round of Geneva Talks ‘Sometimes Difficult’ but ‘Constructive’”, Civil.ge, 2 July 2009, 
retrieved 22 April 2015, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=21187.  
“Tense Talks in Eleventh Round of Geneva Discussions”, Civil.ge, 9 June 2010, retrieved 22 April 
2015, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=22404.  
“Tenth Round of Geneva Talks”, Civil.ge, 20 March 2010, retrieved 22 April 2015, 
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=22135.  
“Thirtieth Round of Geneva Talks”, Civil.ge, 11 December 2014, retrieved 22 April 2015, 
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=27899.   
“Thirty-First Round of Geneva Talks”, Civil.ge, 19 March 2015, retrieved 22 April 2015, 
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=28146.  
“Twelfth Round of Geneva Talks”, Civil.ge, 26 July 2010, retrieved 22 April 2015, 
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=22547.  
“West Rejects Treaty Between Russia, Abkhazia”, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, 25 
November 2014, retrieved 7 April 2015, http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-abkhazia-nato-
european-union-united-states-/26708819.html.  
 
Interviews 
Interview with a Georgian official, Mission of Georgia to the European Union, Brussels, 18 
March 2015. 
Interview with a Senior Associate Eurasia, German Institute for International and Security 
Affairs, via e-mail, 30 March 2015. 
Interview with an European Union (EU) official, European External Action Service (EEAS), 
Brussels, 11 March 2015. 
Interview with an European Union (EU) official, European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM), via 
e-mail, 21 March 2015.   32 
EU Diplomacy Paper 6/2015 
Interview with an European Union (EU) official, Office of the European Union Special 
Representative (EUSR) for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia, European External 
Action Service (EEAS), Brussels, 12 March 2015. 
Interview with Bruno Coppieters, Professor in Political Science, Free University of Brussels, 
Brussels, 9 March 2015. 
Interview with Nicu Popescu, Senior Analyst, European Union Institute for Security Studies 
(EUISS), via Skype, 10 March 2015. 
Interview with Sergi Kapanadze, Former Deputy Foreign Minister and Chief Negotiator of 
Georgia in the Geneva International Discussions (GID), via Skype, 25 March 2015. 
Interview with Thomas de Waal, Senior Associate Russia and Eurasia, Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, Brussels, 18 March 2015. 
 33 
Emilia Jeppsson 
 
List of recent EU Diplomacy Papers 
 
 
For the full list of papers and free download, please visit www.coleurope.eu/EDUP 
 
1/2013 
Thomas Stiegler, Reaching for a Calculator or a Mirror? Why the EU Joins International Human 
Rights Treaties 
2/2013 
Martin Minarik, Approximation to EU Technical Standards with and without the Promise of 
Membership: the Cases of Slovakia and Ukraine  
3/2013 
Raphaël Metais, Ensuring Energy Security in Europe: The EU between a Market-based and a 
Geopolitical Approach 
4/2013 
Raphaël Metais, Charles Thépaut & Stephan Keukeleire (eds.), The European Union’s Rule of 
Law Promotion in its Neighbourhood: A Structural Foreign Policy Analysis 
5/2013 
Hrant Kostanyan & Bruno Vandecasteele, The EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly: The 
European Parliament as a Socializer of its Counterparts in the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood? 
6/2013 
Mirko Woitzik, Pure Business, Law Enforcement or Sheer Politics? The EU’s WTO Complaints 
against Chinese Export Restrictions on Raw Materials 
7/2013 
Domhnall O’Sullivan, Road to Proscription: The EU and Hezbollah since the Arab Spring  
8/2013 
Carl Baudenbacher, The Judicial Dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy 
 
1/2014 
Georg Haßlinger, Climate Conundrums at High Altitude 
2/2014 
Dirk Buschle, Exporting the Internal Market – Panacea or Nemesis for the European 
Neighbourhood Policy? Lessons from the Energy Community  
3/2014 
Leander Leenders, EU Sanctions: A Relevant Foreign Policy Tool? 
4/2014 
Benjamin Thibaut Denis, Afghan Opium and the EU: Fighting the War Economy through 
Development Cooperation 
5/2014 
Nikolaj Borreschmidt, The EU’s Human Rights Promotion in China and Myanmar: Trading Rights 
for Might? 
6/2014 
Adam Kaznowski, Defying the Treaty: The Influence of the Polish and Lithuanian Council 
Presidencies on the Development of the Eastern Partnership 
7/2014 
Nicola Del Medico, A Black Knight in the Eastern Neighbourhood? Russia and EU Democracy 
Promotion in Armenia and Moldova 
8/2014 
Juliane Schmidt, Between Irrelevance and Integration? New Challenges to Diplomacy in the 
21st Century and the Role of the EEAS 
 34 
EU Diplomacy Paper 6/2015 
9/2014 
Eleanor Friel, Riding or Reaping the Whirlwind? An Account of the EU’s Engagement with 
Insecurity in Northern Nigeria 
 
1/2015 
Piotr Kobza, Civilian Power Europe in the Arctic: How Far Can the European Union Go North? 
2/2015 
Jonatan Thompson (ed.), The Atlantic – A Bridge Too Far? TTIP’s Provenance, Prospects and 
Pitfalls 
3/2015 
Mayya Romanova, The European Union against a BRICS Wall? The Case of the Syrian Crisis 
4/2015 
Tim Gemers, Brussels and Reykjavík: Drifting Further Apart? Explaining the Icelandic Public 
Opposition towards EU Membership 
5/2015 
Rannvá Clementsen, Tim Gemers, Raphaël Lemahieu, Andrea Saviolo and Mark Sheetz, 
Prospects for Security on the European Continent 
6/2015 
Emilia Jeppsson, A Differentiated, Balanced and Patient Approach to Conflict Resolution? 
The EU’s Involvement with Georgia’s Secessionist Conflicts beyond the August 2008 War 
 35 
Emilia Jeppsson 
College of Europe Studies 
Order online at www.peterlang.com 
 
 
vol. 18 Schunz, Simon, European Union Foreign Policy and the Global Climate Regime, 2014 (371 p.), 
ISBN 978-2-87574-134-9 pb. 
vol. 17 Govaere, Inge / Hanf, Dominik (eds.), Scrutinizing Internal and External Dimensions of European 
Law: Les dimensions internes et externes du droit européen à l’épreuve, Liber Amicorum Paul Demaret, 
Vol. I and II, 2013 (880 p.), ISBN 978-2-87574-085-4 pb. 
vol. 16 Chang, Michele / Monar, Jörg (eds.), The European Commission in the Post-Lisbon Era of Crises: 
Between Political Leadership and Policy Management (With a Foreword by Commission Vice President 
Maros Sefcovic), 2013 (298p.), ISBN 978-2-87574-028-1 pb. 
vol. 15 Mahncke, Dieter / Gstöhl, Sieglinde (eds.), European Union Diplomacy: Coherence, Unity and 
Effectiveness (with a Foreword by Herman Van Rompuy), 2012 (273 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-842-3 pb. 
vol. 14 Lannon, Erwan (ed.), The European Neighbourhood Policy’s Challenges / Les défis de la 
politique européenne de voisinage, 2012 (491 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-779-2 pb. 
vol. 13 Cremona, Marise / Monar, Jörg / Poli, Sara (eds.), The External Dimension of the European 
Union’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, 2011 (434 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-728-0 pb. 
vol. 12 Men, Jing / Balducci, Giuseppe (eds.), Prospects and Challenges for EU-China Relations in the 
21st Century: The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, 2010 (262 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-641-2 pb. 
vol. 11 Monar, Jörg (ed.), The Institutional Dimension of the European Union’s Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice, 2010 (268 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-615-3 pb. 
vol. 10 Hanf, Dominik / Malacek, Klaus / Muir Elise (dir.), Langues et construction européenne, 2010 (286 
p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-594-1 br. 
vol. 9 Pelkmans, Jacques / Hanf, Dominik / Chang, Michele (eds.), The EU Internal Market in Compara-
tive Perspective: Economic, Political and Legal Analyses, 2008 (314 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-424-1 pb. 
vol. 8 Govaere, Inge / Ullrich, Hans (eds.), Intellectual Property, Market Power and the Public Interest, 
2008 (315 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-422-7 pb. 
vol. 7 Inotai, András, The European Union and Southeastern Europe: Troubled Waters Ahead?, 2007 (414 
p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-071-7 pb. 
vol. 6 Govaere, Inge / Ullrich, Hanns (eds.), Intellectual Property, Public Policy, and International Trade, 
2007 (232 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-064-9 pb. 
vol. 5 Hanf, Dominik / Muñoz, Rodolphe (eds.), La libre circulation des personnes: États des lieux et 
perspectives, 2007 (329 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-061-8 pb. 
vol. 4 Mahncke, Dieter / Gstöhl, Sieglinde (eds.), Europe’s Near Abroad: Promises and Prospects of the 
EU’s Neighbourhood Policy, 2008 (318 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-047-2 pb. 
vol. 3 Mahncke, Dieter / Monar, Jörg (eds.), International Terrorism: A European Response to a Global 
Threat? 2006 (191p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-046-5 / U.S.-ISBN 978-0-8204-6691-0 pb. 
vol. 2 Demaret, Paul / Govaere, Inge / Hanf, Dominik (eds.), European Legal Dynamics - Dynamiques 
juridiques européennes, Revised and updated edition of 30 Years of European Legal Studies at the 
College of Europe, 2005 / 2007 (571 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-067-0 pb. 
vol. 1 Mahncke, Dieter / Ambos, Alicia / Reynolds, Christopher (eds.), European Foreign Policy: From 
Rhetoric to Reality?, 2004 (381 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-247-6/ U.S.-ISBN 978-0-8204-6627-9 pb.  
 36 
